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Abstract
This essay examines the philosophical significance of Ω-logic in Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The dual isomorphism between al-
gebra and coalgebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to
be interpreted as coalgebras. The modal profile of Ω-logical validity can
then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and Ω-logical validity
can be defined via deterministic automata. I argue that the philosophical
significance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and
modal profiles of Ω-logical validity correspond to those of second-order
logical consequence, Ω-logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus vindi-
cates a neo-logicist conception of mathematical truth in the set-theoretic
multiverse. Second, the foregoing provides a modal-computational ac-
count of the interpretation of mathematical vocabulary, adducing in favor
of a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets.
1 Introduction
This essay examines the philosophical significance of the consequence relation
defined in the Ω-logic for set-theoretic languages. I argue that, as with second-
order logic, the modal profile of validity in Ω-Logic enables the property to be
epistemically tractable. Because of the dual isomorphism between algebras and
coalgebras, Boolean-valued models of set theory can be interpreted as coalge-
bras. In Section 2, I demonstrate how the modal profile of Ω-logical validity
can be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and how Ω-logical validity can
∗Forthcoming in d’Alfonso and Berkich (eds),‘On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific
Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence – Themes from IACAP 2016’ (Springer: 2018).
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further be defined via automata. In Section 3, I examine how models of epis-
temic modal algebras to which modal coalgebraic automata are dually isomor-
phic are availed of in the computational theory of mind. Finally, in Section 4,
the philosophical significance of the characterization of the modal profile of Ω-
logical validity for the philosophy of mathematics is examined. I argue (i) that
it vindicates a type of neo-logicism with regard to mathematical truth in the
set-theoretic multiverse, and (ii) that it provides a modal and computational
account of formal grasp of the concept of ’set’, adducing in favor of a realist
conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. Section 5 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Definitions
In this section, I define the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice.
I define the mathematical properties of the large cardinal axioms to which ZFC
can be adjoined, and I provide a detailed characterization of the properties of
Ω-logic for ZFC. Because Boolean-valued algebraic models of Ω-logic are dually
isomorphic to coalgebras, a category of coalgebraic logic is then characterized
which models both modal logic and deterministic automata. Modal coalgebraic
models of automata are then argued to provide a precise characterization of the
modal and computational profiles of Ω-logical validity.
2.1 Axioms1
• Empty set:
∃x∀u(u/∈x)
1For a standard presentation, see Jech (2003). For detailed, historical discussion, see
Maddy (1988,a).
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• Extensionality:
x = y ⇐⇒ ∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈y)
• Pairing:
∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u = a ∨ u = b)
• Union:
∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ ∃v(u∈v ∧ v∈a)]
• Separation:
∃x∀u[u∈x ⇐⇒ u∈a ∧ φ(u)]
• Power Set:
∃x∀u(u∈x ⇐⇒ u⊆a)
• Infinity:
∃x∅∈x ∧ ∀u(u∈x → {u}∈x)
• Replacement:
∀u∃!vψ(u,v) → ∀x∃y(∀u∈x)(∃v∈y)ψ(u,v)
• Choice:
∀u[u∈a → ∃v(v∈u)] ∧ ∀u,x[u∈a ∧ x∈a → ∃v(v∈u ⇐⇒ v∈x) ∨ ¬v(v∈u
∧ v∈x)] → ∃x∀u[u∈a → ∃!v(v∈u ∧ u∈x)]
2.2 Large Cardinals
Borel sets of reals are subsets of ωω or R, closed under countable intersections
and unions.2 For all ordinals, a, such that 0 < a < ω1, and b < a, Σ
0
a denotes
2See Koellner (2013), for the presentation, and for further discussion, of the definitions in
this and the subsequent paragraph.
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the open subsets of ωω formed under countable unions of sets in Π0b, and Π
0
a
denotes the closed subsets of ωω formed under countable intersections of Σ0b.
Projective sets of reals are subsets of ωω, formed by complementations (ωω –
u, for u⊆ωω) and projections [p(u) = {〈x1, . . . , xn〉∈ωω | ∃y〈x1, . . . , xn, y〉∈u}].
For all ordinals a, such that 0 < a < ω, Π10 denotes closed subsets of ω
ω; Π1a
is formed by taking complements of the open subsets of ωω, Σ1a; and Σ
1
a+1 is
formed by taking projections of sets in Π1a.
The full power set operation defines the cumulative hierarchy of sets, V, such
that V0 = ∅; Va+1 = P (V0); and Vλ =
⋃
a<λVa.
In the inner model program (cf. Woodin, 2001, 2010, 2011; Kanamori,
2012,a,b), the definable power set operation defines the constructible universe,
L(R), in the universe of sets V, where the sets are transitive such that a∈C
⇐⇒ a⊆C; L(R) = Vω+1; La+1(R) = Def(La(R)); and Lλ(R) =
⋃
a<λ(La(R)).
Via inner models, Gödel (1940) proves the consistency of the generalized
continuum hypothesis, ℵaℵa = ℵa+1, as well as the axiom of choice, relative to
the axioms of ZFC. However, for a countable transitive set of ordinals, M, in
a model of ZF without choice, one can define a generic set, G, such that, for
all formulas, φ, either φ or ¬φ is forced by a condition, f , in G. Let M[G] =
⋃
a<κMa[G], such that M0[G] = {G}; with λ < κ, Mλ[G] =
⋃
a<λMa[G]; and
Ma+1[G] = Va ∩ Ma[G].
3 G is a Cohen real over M, and comprises a set-forcing
extension of M. The relation of set-forcing, , can then be defined in the ground
model, M, such that the forcing condition, f , is a function from a finite subset of
ω into {0,1}, and f  u∈G if f(u) = 1 and f  u/∈G if f(u) = 0. The cardinalities
of an open dense ground model, M, and a generic extension, G, are identical,
only if the countable chain condition (c.c.c.) is satisfied, such that, given a chain
3See Kanamori (2012,a: 2.1; 2012,b: 4.1), for further discussion.
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– i.e., a linearly ordered subset of a partially ordered (reflexive, antisymmetric,
transitive) set – there is a countable, maximal antichain consisting of pairwise
incompatible forcing conditions. Via set-forcing extensions, Cohen (1963, 1964)
constructs a model of ZF which negates the generalized continuum hypothesis,
and thus proves the independence thereof relative to the axioms of ZF.4
Gödel (1946/1990: 1-2) proposes that the value of Orey sentences such as
the GCH might yet be decidable, if one avails of stronger theories to which new
axioms of infinity – i.e., large cardinal axioms – are adjoined.5 He writes that:
’In set theory, e.g., the successive extensions can be represented by stronger and
stronger axioms of infinity. It is certainly impossible to give a combinatorial
and decidable characterization of what an axiom of infinity is; but there might
exist, e.g., a characterization of the following sort: An axiom of infinity is
a proposition which has a certain (decidable) formal structure and which in
addition is true. Such a concept of demonstrability might have the required
closure property, i.e. the following could be true: Any proof for a set-theoretic
theorem in the next higher system above set theory . . . is replaceable by a proof
from such an axiom of infinity. It is not impossible that for such a concept of
demonstrability some completeness theorem would hold which would say that
every proposition expressible in set theory is decidable from present axioms plus
some true assertion about the largeness of the universe of sets’.
For cardinals, x,a,C, C⊆a is closed unbounded in a, if it is closed [if x < C
and
⋃
(C∩a) = a, then a∈C] and unbounded (
⋃
C = a) (Kanamori, op. cit.:
360). A cardinal, S, is stationary in a, if, for any closed unbounded C⊆a, C∩S 6=
∅ (op. cit.). An ideal is a subset of a set closed under countable unions, whereas
4See Kanamori (2008), for further discussion.
5See Kanamori (2007), for further discussion. Kanamori (op. cit.: 154) notes that Gödel
(1931/1986: fn48a) makes a similar appeal to higher-order languages, in his proofs of the
incompleteness theorems. The incompleteness theorems are examined in further detail, in
Section 4.2, below.
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filters are subsets closed under countable intersections (361). A cardinal κ is
regular if the cofinality of κ – comprised of the unions of sets with cardinality
less than κ – is identical to κ. Uncountable regular limit cardinals are weakly
inaccessible (op. cit.). A strongly inaccessible cardinal is regular and has a
strong limit, such that if λ < κ, then 2λ < κ (op. cit.).
Large cardinal axioms are defined by elementary embeddings.6 Elementary
embeddings can be defined thus. For models A,B, and conditions φ, j: A → B,
φ〈a1, . . . , an〉 in A if and only if φ〈j(a1), . . . , j(an)〉 in B (363). A measurable
cardinal is defined as the ordinal denoted by the critical point of j, crit(j) (Koell-
ner and Woodin, 2010: 7). Measurable cardinals are inaccessible (Kanamori,
op. cit.).
Let κ be a cardinal, and η > κ an ordinal. κ is then η-strong, if there is a
transitive class M and an elementary embedding, j: V→ M, such that crit(j) =
κ, j(κ) >η, and Vη⊆M (Koellner and Woodin, op. cit.).
κ is strong if and only if, for all η, it is η-strong (op. cit.).
If A is a class, κ is η-A-strong, if there is a j: V→ M, such that κ is η-strong
and j(A∩Vκ)∩Vη = A∩Vη (op. cit.).
κ is a Woodin cardinal, if κ is strongly inaccessible, and for all A⊆Vκ, there
is a cardinal κA < κ, such that κA is η-A-strong, for all η such that κη, η < κ
(Koellner and Woodin, op. cit.: 8).
κ is superstrong, if j: V → M, such that crit(j) = κ and Vj(κ)⊆M, which
entails that there are arbitrarily large Woodin cardinals below κ (op. cit.).
Large cardinal axioms can then be defined as follows.
∃xΦ is a large cardinal axiom, because:
(i) Φx is a Σ2-formula;
6The definitions in the remainder of this subsection follow the presentations in Koellner
and Woodin (2010) and Woodin (2010, 2011).
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(ii) if κ is a cardinal, such that V |= Φ(κ), then κ is strongly inaccessible;
and
(iii) for all generic partial orders P∈Vκ, VP |= Φ(κ); INS is a non-stationary
ideal; AG is the canonical representation of reals in L(R), i.e. the interpretation
of A in M[G]; H(κ) is comprised of all of the sets whose transitive closure is
< κ (cf. Rittberg, 2015); and L(R)Pmax |= 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS, AG〉 |= ’φ’. P is
a homogeneous partial order in L(R), such that the generic extension of L(R)P
inherits the generic invariance, i.e., the absoluteness, of L(R). Thus, L(R)Pmax
is (i) effectively complete, i.e. invariant under set-forcing extensions; and (ii)
maximal, i.e. satisfies all Π2-sentences and is thus consistent by set-forcing over
ground models (Woodin, ms: 28).
Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals; A∈P(R)
∩ L(R); φ is a Π2-sentence; and V(G), s.t. 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS , AG〉 |= ’φ’: Then,
it can be proven that L(R)Pmax |= 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS , A
G〉 |= ’φ’, where ’φ’ :=
∃A∈Γ∞〈H(ω1), ∈, A〉 |= ψ.
The axiom of determinacy (AD) states that every set of reals, a⊆ωω is
determined, where κ is determined if it is decidable.
Woodin’s (1999) Axiom (*) can be thus countenanced:
ADL(R) and L[(Pω1)] is a Pmax-generic extension of L(R),
from which it can be derived that 2ℵ0 = ℵ2. Thus, ¬CH; and so CH is
absolutely decidable.
2.3 Ω-Logic
For partial orders, P, let VP = VB, where B is the regular open completion
of (P).7 Ma = (Va)
M and MBa = (V
B
a)
M = (Va
MB). Sent denotes a set of
7The definitions in this section follow the presentation in Bagaria et al. (2006).
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sentences in a first-order language of set theory. T∪{φ} is a set of sentences
extending ZFC. c.t.m abbreviates the notion of a countable transitive ∈-model.
c.B.a. abbreviates the notion of a complete Boolean algebra.
Define a c.B.a. in V, such that VB. Let VB0 = ∅; VBλ =
⋃
b<λV
B
b, with λ
a limit ordinal; VBa+1 = {f: X → B | X ⊆VBa}; and VB =
⋃
a∈OnV
B
a.
φ is true in VB, if its Boolean-value is 1B, if and only if
VB |= φ iff JφKB = 1B.
Thus, for all ordinals, a, and every c.B.a. B, VBa ≡ (Va)V
B
iff for all x∈VB,
∃y∈VBJx = yKB = 1B iff Jx∈VBKB = 1B.
Then, VBa |= φ iff VB |= ’Va |= φ’.
Ω-logical validity can then be defined as follows:
For T∪{φ}⊆Sent,
T |=Ω φ, if for all ordinals, a, and c.B.a. B, if VBa |= T, then VBa |= φ.
Supposing that there exists a proper class of Woodin cardinals and if T∪{φ}⊆Sent,
then for all set-forcing conditions, P:
T |=Ω φ iff VT |= ’T |=Ω φ’,
where T |=Ω φ ≡ ∅ |= ’T |=Ω φ’.
The Ω-Conjecture states that V |=Ω φ iff VB |=Ω φ (Woodin, ms). Thus,
Ω-logical validity is invariant in all set-forcing extensions of ground models in
the set-theoretic multiverse.
The soundness of Ω-Logic is defined by universally Baire sets of reals. For
a cardinal, e, let a set A be e-universally Baire, if for all partial orders P of
cardinality e, there exist trees, S and T on ω X λ, such that A = p[T] and if
G⊆P is generic, then p[T]G = RG – p[S]G (Koellner, 2013). A is universally
Baire, if it is e-universally Baire for all e (op. cit.).
Ω-Logic is sound, such that V ⊢Ω φ → V |=Ω φ. However, the completeness
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of Ω-Logic has yet to be resolved.
Finally, in category theory, a category C is comprised of a class Ob(C) of
objects a family of arrows for each pair of objects C(A,B) (Venema, 2007: 421).
A functor from a category C to a category D, E: C→ D, is an operation mapping
objects and arrows of C to objects and arrows of D (422). An endofunctor on
C is a functor, E: C → C (op. cit.).
A E-coalgebra is a pair A = (A, µ), with A an object of C referred to as the
carrier of A, and µ: A → E(A) is an arrow in C, referred to as the transition
map of A (390).
A = 〈A, µ: A→ E(A)〉 is dually isomorphic to the category of algebras over
the functor µ (417-418). If µ is a functor on categories of sets, then Boolean-
algebraic models of Ω-logical validity are isomorphic to coalgebraic models.
The significance of the foregoing is that coalgebraic models may themselves
be availed of in order to define modal logic and automata theory. Coalgebras
provide therefore a setting in which the Boolean-valued models of set theory,
the modal profile of Ω-logical validity, and automata can be interdefined. In
what follows, A will comprise the coalgebraic model – dually isomorphic to the
complete Boolean-valued algebras defined in the Ω-Logic of ZFC – in which
modal similarity types and automata are definable. As a coalgebraic model of
modal logic, A can be defined as follows (407):
For a set of formulas, Φ, let ∇Φ := 
∨
Φ ∧
∧
⋄Φ, where ⋄Φ denotes the
set {⋄φ | φ∈Φ (op. cit.). Then,
⋄φ ≡ ∇{φ, T},
φ ≡ ∇∅ ∨ ∇φ (op. cit.).
Let an E-coalgebraic modal model, A = 〈S,λ,R[.]〉, such that S,s  ∇Φ if
and only if, for all (some) successors σ of s∈S, [Φ,σ(s)∈E(A)] (op. cit.).
9
A coalgebraic model of deterministic automata can be thus defined (391).
An automaton is a tuple, A = 〈A, aI , C, δ, F〉, such that A is the state space
of the automaton A; aI∈A is the automaton’s initial state; C is the coding
for the automaton’s alphabet, mapping numerals to properties of the natural
numbers; δ: A X C → A is a transition function, and F⊆ A is the collection of
admissible states, where F maps A to {1,0}, such that F: A→ 1 if a∈F and A→
0 if a/∈F (op. cit.). The determinacy of coalgebraic automata, the category of
which is dually isomorphic to the Set category satisfying Ω-logical consequence,
is secured by the existence of Woodin cardinals: Assuming ZFC, that λ is a
limit of Woodin cardinals, that there is a generic, set-forcing extension G ⊆ the
collapse of ω < λ, and that R* =
⋃
{RG[a] | a < λ}, then R* |= the axiom of
determinacy (AD) (Koellner and Woodin, op. cit.: 10).
Finally, A = 〈A, α:A → E(A)〉 is dually isomorphic to the category of alge-
bras over the functor α (417-418). For a category C, object A, and endofunctor
E, define a new arrow, α, s.t. α:EA → A. A homomorphism, f , can further be
defined between algebras 〈A, α〉, and 〈B, β〉. Then, for the category of algebras,
the following commutative square can be defined: (i) EA → EB (Ef); (ii) EA
→ A (α); (iii) EB → B (β); and (iv) A → B (f) (cf. Hughes, 2001: 7-8). The
same commutative square holds for the category of coalgebras, such that the
latter are defined by inverting the direction of the morphisms in both (ii) [A →
EA (α)], and (iii) [B → EB (β)] (op. cit.).
Thus, A is the coalgebraic category for modal, deterministic automata, du-
ally isomorphic to the complete Boolean-valued algebraic models of Ω-logical
validity, as defined in the category of sets.
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3 Epistemic Modal Algebras and the Computa-
tional Theory of Mind
Beyond the remit of Boolean-valued models of set-theoretic languages, models
of epistemic modal algebras are availed of by a number of paradigms in con-
temporary empirical theorizing, including the computational theory of mind
and the theory of quantum computability. In Epistemic Modal Algebra, the
topological boolean algebra, A, can be formed by taking the powerset of the
topological space, X, defined above; i.e., A = P(X). The domain of A is com-
prised of formula-terms – eliding propositions with names – assigned to elements
of P(X), where the proposition-letters are interpreted as encoding states of in-
formation. The top element of the algebra is denoted ’1’ and the bottom element
is denoted ’0’. We interpret modal operators, f(x), – i.e., intensional functions
in the algebra – as both concerning topological interiority, as well as reflecting
epistemic possibilities. An Epistemic Modal-valued Algebraic structure has the
form, F = 〈A, DP (X), ρ〉, where ρ is a mapping from points in the topological
space to elements or regions of the algebraic structure; i.e., ρ : DP (X) x DP (X)
→ A. A model over the Epistemic-Modal Topological Boolean Algebraic struc-
ture has the form M = 〈F, V〉, where V(a) ≤ ρ(a) and V(a,b) ∧ ρ(a, b) ≤ V(b).8
For all xx/a,φ,y∈A:
f(1) = 1;
f(x) ≤ x;
f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y);
f[f(x)] = f(x);
V(a, a) > 0;
8See Lando (2015); McKinsey and Tarski (1944); and Rasiowa (1963), for further details.
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V(a, a) = 1;
V(a, b) = V(b, a);
V(a, b) ∧ V(b, c) ≤ V(a, c);
V(a = a) = ρ(a, a);
V(a, b) ≤ f[V(a, b)];
V(¬φ) = ρ(¬φ) – f(φ);
V(⋄φ) = ρφ – f[– V(φ)];
V(φ) = f[V(φ)] (cf. Lando, op. cit.).9
Marcus (2001) argues that mental representations can be treated as alge-
braic rules characterizing the computation of operations on variables, where the
values of a target domain for the variables are universally quantified over and
the function is one-one, mapping a number of inputs to an equivalent number of
outputs (35-36). Models of the above algebraic rules can be defined in both clas-
sical and weighted, connectionist systems: Both a single and multiple nodes can
serve to represent the variables for a target domain (42-45). Temporal synchrony
or dynamic variable-bindings are stored in short-term working memory (56-57),
while information relevant to long-term variable-bindings are stored in registers
(54-56). Examples of the foregoing algebraic rules on variable-binding include
both the syntactic concatenation of morphemes and noun phrase reduplication
in linguistics (37-39, 70-72), as well as learning algorithms (45-48). Conditions
on variable-binding are further examined, including treating the binding rela-
tion between variables and values as tensor products – i.e., an application of
a multiplicative axiom for variables and their values treated as vectors (53-54,
105-106). In order to account for recursively formed, complex representations,
which he refers to as structured propositions, Marcus argues instead that the
9Note that, in cases of Boolean-valued epistemic topological algebras, models of corre-
sponding coalgebras will be topological (cf. Takeuchi, 1985 for further discussion).
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syntax and semantics of such representations can be modeled via an ordered set
of registers, which he refers to as ’treelets’ (108).
A strengthened version of the algebraic rules on variable-binding can be
accommodated in models of epistemic modal algebras, when the latter are
augmented by cylindrifications, i.e., operators on the algebra simulating the
treatment of quantification, and diagonal elements.10 By contrast to Boolean
Algebras with Operators, which are propositional, cylindric algebras define first-
order logics. Intuitively, valuation assignments for first-order variables are, in
cylindric modal logics, treated as possible worlds of the model, while existential
and universal quantifiers are replaced by, respectively, possibility and necessity
operators (⋄ and ) (Venema, 2013: 249). For first-order variables, {vi | i <
α} with α an arbitrary, fixed ordinal, vi = vj is replaced by a modal constant
di,j (op. cit: 250). The following clauses are valid, then, for a model, M, of
cylindric modal logic, with Ei,j a monadic predicate and Ti for i,j < α a dyadic
predicate:
M,w  p ⇐⇒ w∈V(p);
M,w  di,j ⇐⇒ w∈Ei,j ;
M,w  ⋄iψ ⇐⇒ there is a v with wTiv and M,v ⊢ ψ (252).11
Finally, a cylindric modal algebra of dimension α is an algebra, A = 〈A, +,
•, –, 0, 1, ⋄i, dij〉i,j<α, where ⋄i is a unary operator which is normal (⋄i0 = 0)
10See Henkin et al (op. cit.: 162-163) for the introduction of cylindric algebras, and for the
axioms governing the cylindrification operators.
11Cylindric frames need further to satisfy the following axioms (op. cit.: 254):
1. p → ⋄ip
2. p → i⋄ip
3. ⋄i⋄ip → ⋄ip
4. ⋄i⋄jp → ⋄j⋄ip
5. di,i
6. ⋄i(di,j ∧ p) → i(di,j → p)
[Translating the diagonal element and cylindric (modal) operator into, respectively, monadic
and dyadic predicates and universal quantification: ∀xyz[(Tixy ∧ Ei,jy ∧ Tixz ∧ Ei,jz) → y
= z] (op. cit.)]
7. di,j ⇐⇒ ⋄k(di,k ∧ dk,j).
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and additive [⋄i(x + y) = ⋄ix + ⋄iy)] (257).
The philosophical interest of cylindric modal algebras to Marcus’ cognitive
models of algebraic variable-binding is that variable substitution is treated in
the modal algebras as a modal relation, while universal quantification is inter-
preted as necessitation. The interest of translating universal generalization into
operations of epistemic necessitation is, finally, that – by identifying epistemic
necessity with apriority – both the algebraic rules for variable-binding and the
recursive formation of structured propositions can be seen as operations, the
implicit knowledge of which is apriori.
In quantum information theory, let a constructor be a computation defined
over physical systems. Constructors entrain nomologically possible transforma-
tions from admissible input states to output states (cf. Deutsch, 2013). On this
approach, information is defined in terms of constructors, i.e., intensional com-
putational properties. The foregoing transformations, as induced by construc-
tors, are referred to as tasks. Because constructors encode the counterfactual to
the effect that, were an initial state to be computed over, then the output state
would result, modal notions are thus constitutive of the definition of the tasks
at issue. There are, further, both topological and algebraic aspects of the fore-
going modal approach to quantum computation.12 The composition of tasks is
formed by taking their union, where the union of tasks can be satisfiable while
its component tasks might not be. Suppose, e.g., that the information states at
issue concern the spin of a particle. A spin-state vector will be the sum of the
probabilities that the particle is spinning either upward or downward. Suppose
that there are two particles which can be spinning either upward or downward.
Both particles can be spinning upward; spinning downward; particle-1 can be
12For an examination of the interaction between topos theory and an S4 modal axiomati-
zation of computable functions, see Awodey et al. (2000).
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spinning upward while particle-2 spins downward; and vice versa. The state
vector, V which records the foregoing possibilities – i.e., the superposition of
the states – will be equal to the product of the spin-state of particle-1 and
the spin-state of particle-2. If the particles are both spinning upward or both
spinning downward, then V will be .5. However – relative to the value of each
particle vector, referred to as its eigenvalue – the probability that particle-1 will
be spinning upward is .5 and the probability that particle-2 will be spinning
downward is .5, such that the probability that both will be spinning upward or
downward = .5 x .5 = .25. Considered as the superposition of the two states,
V will thus be unequal to the product of their eigenvalues, and is said to be
entangled. If the indeterminacy evinced by entangled states is interpreted as
inconsistency, then the computational properties at issue might further have to
be defined on a distribution of epistemic possibilities which permit of hyperin-
tensional distinctions.13
4 Modal Coalgebraic Automata and the Philos-
ophy of Mathematics
This section examines the philosophical significance of the Boolean-valued mod-
els of set-theoretic languages and the modal coalgebraic automata to which
they are dually isomorphic. I argue that, similarly to second-order logical con-
sequence, (i) the ’mathematical entanglement’ of Ω-logical validity does not
undermine its status as a relation of pure logic; and (ii) both the modal profile
and model-theoretic characterization of Ω-logical consequence provide a guide
13The nature of the indeterminacy in question is examined in Saunders and Wallace (2008),
Deutsch (2010), Hawthorne (2010), Wilson (2011), Wallace (2012: 287-289), Lewis (2016:
277-278), and Khudairi (ms). For a thorough examination of approaches to the ontology of
quantum mechanics, see Arntzenius (2012: ch. 3).
15
to its epistemic tractability.14 I argue, then, that there are several considera-
tions adducing in favor of the claim that the interpretation of the concept of
set constitutively involves modal notions. The role of the category of modal
coalegebraic deterministic automata in (i) characterizing the modal profile of
Ω-logical consequence, and (ii) being constitutive of the formal understanding-
conditions for the concept of set, provides, then, support for a realist conception
of the cumulative hierarchy.
4.1 Neo-Logicism
Frege’s (1884/1980; 1893/2013) proposal – that cardinal numbers can be ex-
plained by specifying an equivalence relation, expressible in the signature of
second-order logic and identity, on lower-order representatives for higher-order
entities – is the first attempt to provide a foundation for mathematics on the
basis of logical axioms rather than rational or empirical intuition. In Frege
(1884/1980. cit.: 68) and Wright (1983: 104-105), the number of the concept,
A, is argued to be identical to the number of the concept, B, if and only if
there is a one-to-one correspondence between A and B, i.e., there is a bijective
mapping, R, from A to B. With Nx: a numerical term-forming operator,
• ∀A∀B∃R[[Nx: A = Nx: B ≡ ∃R[∀x[Ax → ∃y(By ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Bz ∧ Rxz
→ y = z))] ∧ ∀y[By → ∃x(Ax ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Az ∧ Rzy → x = z))]]].
Frege’s Theorem states that the Dedekind-Peano axioms for the language of
arithmetic can be derived from the foregoing abstraction principle, as augmented
to the signature of second-order logic and identity.15 Thus, if second-order logic
14The phrase, ’mathematical entanglement’, is owing to Koellner (2010: 2).
15Cf. Dedekind (1888/1963) and Peano (1889/1967). See Wright (1983: 154-169) for a proof
sketch of Frege’s theorem; Boolos (1987) for the formal proof thereof; and Parsons (1964) for
an incipient conjecture of the theorem’s validity.
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may be counted as pure logic, despite that domains of second-order models
are definable via power set operations, then one aspect of the philosophical
significance of the abstractionist program consists in its provision of a foundation
for classical mathematics on the basis of pure logic as augmented with non-
logical implicit definitions expressed by abstraction principles.
There are at least three reasons for which a logic defined in ZFC might
not undermine the status of its consequence relation as being logical. The first
reason for which the mathematical entanglement of Ω-logical validity might be
innocuous is that, as Shapiro (1991: 5.1.4) notes, many mathematical properties
cannot be defined within first-order logic, and instead require the expressive
resources of second-order logic. For example, the notion of well-foundedness
cannot be expressed in a first-order framework, as evinced by considerations of
compactness. Let E be a binary relation. Let m be a well-founded model, if
there is no infinite sequence, a0, . . . , ai, such that Ea0, . . . , Eai+1 are all true.
If m is well-founded, then there are no infinite-descending E-chains. Suppose
that T is a first-order theory containing m, and that, for all natural numbers, n,
there is a T with n + 1 elements, a0, . . . , an, such that 〈a0, a1〉, . . . , 〈an, an−1〉
are in the extension of E. By compactness, there is an infinite sequence such
that that a0 . . . ai, s.t. Ea0, . . . , Eai+1 are all true. So, m is not well-founded.
By contrast, however, well-foundedness can be expressed in a second-order
framework:
∀X [∃xXx → ∃x[Xx ∧ ∀y(Xy → ¬Eyx)]], such that m is well-founded iff
every non-empty subset X has an element x, s.t. nothing in X bears E to x.
One aspect of the philosophical significance of well-foundedness is that it
provides a distinctively second-order constraint on when the membership rela-
tion in a given model is intended. This contrasts with Putnam’s (1980) claim,
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that first-order modelsmod can be intended, if every set s of reals inmod is such
that an ω-model in mod contains s and is constructible, such that – given the
Downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem16 – if mod is non-constructible but has
a submodel satisfying ’s is constructible’, then the model is non-well-founded
and yet must be intended. The claim depends on the assumption that general
understanding-conditions and conditions on intendedness must be co-extensive,
to which I will return in Section 4.2
A second reason for which Ω-logic’s mathematical entanglement might not be
pernicious, such that the consequence relation specified in the Ω-logic might be
genuinely logical, may again be appreciated by its comparison with second-order
logic. Shapiro (1998) defines the model-theoretic characterization of logical
consequence as follows:
’(10) Φ is a logical consequence of [a model] Γ if Φ holds in all possibilities
under every interpretation of the nonlogical terminology which holds in Γ’ (148).
A condition on the foregoing is referred to as the ’isomorphism property’,
according to which ’if two models M, M’ are isomorphic vis-a-vis the nonlogical
items in a formula Φ, then M satisfies Φ if and only if M’ satisfies Φ’ (151).
Shapiro argues, then, that the consequence relation specified using second-
order resources is logical, because of its modal and epistemic profiles. The
epistemic tractability of second-order validity consists in ’typical soundness the-
orems, where one shows that a given deductive system is ’truth-preserving’
(154). He writes that: ’[I]f we know that a model is a good mathematical model
of logical consequence (10), then we know that we won’t go wrong using a sound
deductive system. Also, we can know that an argument is a logical consequence
. . . via a set-theoretic proof in the metatheory’ (154-155).
16For any first-order modelM ,M has a submodelM ′ whose domain is at most denumerably
infinite, s.t. for all assignments s on, and formulas φ(x) in, M ′, M ,s φ(x) ⇐⇒ M ′,s φ(x).
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The modal profile of second-order validity provides a second means of ac-
counting for the property’s epistemic tractability. Shapiro argues, e.g., that: ’If
the isomorphism property holds, then in evaluating sentences and arguments,
the only ’possibility’ we need to ’vary’ is the size of the universe. If enough sizes
are represented in the universe of models, then the modal nature of logical con-
sequence will be registered . . . [T]he only ’modality’ we keep is ’possible size’,
which is relegated to the set-theoretic metatheory’ (152).
Shapiro’s remarks about the considerations adducing in favor of the logicality
of non-effective, second-order validity generalize to Ω-logical validity. In the
previous section, the modal profile of Ω-logical validity was codified by the dual
isomorphism between complete Boolean-valued algebraic models of Ω-logic and
the category, A, of coalgebraic modal logics. As with Shapiro’s definition of
logical consequence, where Φ holds in all possibilities in the universe of models
and the possibilities concern the ’possible size’ in the set-theoretic metatheory,
the Ω-Conjecture states that V |=Ω φ iff VB |=Ω φ, such that Ω-logical validity
is invariant in all set-forcing extensions of ground models in the set-theoretic
multiverse.
Finally, the epistemic tractability of Ω-logical validity is secured, both – as
on Shapiro’s account of second-order logical consequence – by its soundness, but
also by its isomorphism to the coalgebraic category of deterministic automata,
where the determinacy thereof is again secured by the existence of Woodin
cardinals.
4.2 Set-theoretic Realism
In this section, I argue, finally, that the modal profile of Ω-logic can be availed
of in order to account for the understanding-conditions of the concept of set,
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and thus crucially serve as part of the argument for set-theoretic realism.
Putnam (op. cit.: 473-474) argues that defining models of first-order theories
is sufficient for both understanding and specifying an intended interpretation
of the latter. Wright (1985: 124-125) argues, by contrast, that understanding-
conditions for mathematical concepts cannot be exhausted by the axioms for
the theories thereof, even on the intended interpretations of the theories. He
suggests, e.g., that:
’[I]f there really were uncountable sets, their existence would surely have to
flow from the concept of set, as intuitively satisfactorily explained. Here, there
is, as it seems to me, no assumption that the content of the ZF-axioms cannot
exceed what is invariant under all their classical models. [Benacerraf] writes,
e.g., that: ’It is granted that they are to have their ’intended interpretation’: ’e’
is to mean set-membership. Even so, and conceived as encoding the intuitive
concept of set, they fail to entail the existence of uncountable sets. So how can
it be true that there are such sets? Benacerraf’s reply is that the ZF-axioms are
indeed faithful to the relevant informal notions only if, in addition to ensuring
that ’E’ means set-membership, we interpret them so as to observe the constraint
that ’the universal quantifier has to mean all or at least all sets’ (p. 103).
It follows, of course, that if the concept of set does determine a background
against which Cantor’s theorem, under its intended interpretation, is sound,
there is more to the concept of set that can be explained by communication of
the intended sense of ’e’ and the stipulation that the ZF-axioms are to hold.
And the residue is contained, presumably, in the informal explanations to which,
Benacerraf reminds us, Zermelo intended his formalization to answer. At least,
this must be so if the ’intuitive concept of set’ is capable of being explained at
all. Yet it is notable that Benacerraf nowhere ventures to supply the missing
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informal explanation – the story which will pack enough into the extension of
’all sets’ to yield Cantor’s theorem, under its intended interpretation, as a highly
non-trivial corollary’( op. cit).
In order to provide the foregoing explanation in virtue of which the concept
of set can be shown to be associated with a realistic notion of the cumulative
hierarchy, I will argue that there are several points in the model theory and
epistemology of set-theoretic languages at which the interpretation of the con-
cept of set constitutively involves modal notions. The aim of the section will
thus be to provide a modal foundation for mathematical platonism.
One point is in the coding of the signature of the theory, T, in which Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems are proved (cf. Halbach and Visser, 2014). Relative
to,
(i) a choice of coding for an ω-complete, recursively axiomatizable language,
L, of T – i.e. a mapping between properties of numbers and properties of terms
and formulas in L;
(ii) a predicate, phi; and
(iii) a fixed-point construction:
Let phi express the property of ’being provable’, and define (iii) such that,
for all consistent theories T of L, there are sentences, pphi, corresponding to
each formula, phi(x), in T, s.t. for ’m’ := pphi,
|–T pphi iff phi(m).
One can then construct a sentence, ’m’ := ¬phi(m), such that L is incomplete
(the first incompleteness theorem).
Moreover, L cannot prove its own consistency:
If:
|–T ’m’ iff ¬phi(m),
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Then:
|–T C → m.
Thus, L is consistent only if L is inconsistent (the second incompleteness
theorem).
In the foregoing, the choice of coding bridges the numerals in the language
with the properties of the target numbers. The choice of coding is therefore
intensional, and has been marshalled in order to argue that the very notion
of syntactic computability – via the equivalence class of partial recursive func-
tions, λ-definable terms, and the transition functions of discrete-state automata
such as Turing machines – is constitutively semantic (cf. Rescorla, 2015). Fur-
ther points at which intensionality can be witnessed in the phenomenon of self-
reference in arithmetic are introduced by Reinhardt (1986). Reinhardt (op.
cit.: 470-472) argues that the provability predicate can be defined relative to
the minds of particular agents – similarly to Quine’s (1968) and Lewis’ (1979)
suggestion that possible worlds can be centered by defining them relative to pa-
rameters ranging over tuples of spacetime coordinates or agents and locations –
and that a theoretical identity statement can be established for the concept of
the foregoing minds and the concept of a computable system.
In the previous section, intensional computational properties were defined
via modal coalgebraic deterministic automata, where the coalgebraic categories
are dually isomorphic to the category of sets in which Ω-logical validity was
defined. Coalgebraic modal logic was shown to elucidate the modal profile
of Ω-logical consequence in the Boolean-valued algebraic models of set theory.
The intensionality witnessed by the choice of coding may therefore be further
witnessed by the modal automata specified in the foregoing coalgebraic logic.
A second point at which understanding-conditions may be shown to be con-
22
stitutively modal can be witnessed by the conditions on the epistemic entitle-
ment to assume that the language in which Gödel’s second incompleteness the-
orem is proved is consistent (cf. Dummett, 1963/1978; Wright, 1985). Wright
(op. cit.: 91, fn.9) suggests that ’[T]o treat [a] proof as establishing consistency
is implicitly to exclude any doubt . . . about the consistency of first-order num-
ber theory’. Wright’s elaboration of the notion of epistemic entitlement, appeals
to a notion of rational ’trust’, which he argues is recorded by the calculation of
’expected epistemic utility’ in the setting of decision theory (2004; 2014: 226,
241). Wright notes that the rational trust subserving epistemic entitlement will
be pragmatic, and makes the intriguing point that ’pragmatic reasons are not
a special genre of reason, to be contrasted with e.g. epistemic, prudential, and
moral reasons’ (2012: 484). Crucially, however, the very idea of expected epis-
temic utility in the setting of decision theory makes implicit appeal to the notion
of possible worlds, where the latter can again be determined by the coalgebraic
logic for modal automata.
A third consideration adducing in favor of the thought that grasp of the con-
cept of set might constitutively possess a modal profile is that the concept can be
defined as an intension – i.e., a function from possible worlds to extensions. The
modal similarity types in the coalgebraic modal logic may then be interpreted as
dynamic-interpretational modalities, where the dynamic-interpretational modal
operator has been argued to entrain the possible reinterpretations both of the
domains of the theory’s quantifiers (cf. Fine, 2005, 2006), as well as of the in-
tensions of non-logical concepts, such as the membership relation (cf. Uzquiano,
2015).17
17For an examination of the philosophical significance of modal coalgebraic automata beyond
the philosophy of mathematics, see Baltag (2003). Baltag (op. cit.) proffers a colagebraic
semantics for dynamic-epistemic logic, where coalgebraic functors are intended to record the
informational dynamics of single- and multi-agent systems. For an algebraic characterization
of dynamic-epistemic logic, see Kurz and Palmigiano (2013). For further discussion, see
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The fourth consideration avails directly of the modal profile of Ω-logical
consequence. While the above dynamic-interpretational modality will suffice for
possible reinterpretations of mathematical terms, the absoluteness and generic
invariance of the consequence relation is such that, if the Ω-conjecture is true,
then Ω-logical validity is invariant in all possible set-forcing extensions of ground
models in the set-theoretic multiverse. The truth of the Ω-conjecture would
thereby place an indefeasible necessary condition on a formal understanding of
the intension for the concept of set.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this essay I have examined the philosophical significance of the isomorphism
between Boolean-valued algebraic models of modal Ω-logic and modal coalge-
braic models of automata. I argued that – as with the property of validity in
second-order logic – Ω-logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus entails a
type of neo-logicism in the foundations of mathematics. I argued, then, that
modal coalegebraic deterministic automata, which characterize the modal profile
of Ω-logical consequence, are constitutive of the interpretation of mathemati-
cal concepts such as the membership relation. The philosophical significance of
modal Ω-logic is thus that it can be availed of to vindicate both a neo-logicist
foundation for set theory and a realist interpretation of the cumulative hierarchy
of sets.
Khudairi (ms). The latter proceeds by examining undecidable sentences via the epistemic
interpretation of multi-dimensional intensional semantics. See Reinhardt (1974), for a similar
epistemic interpretation of set-theoretic languages, in order to examine the reduction of the
incompleteness of undecidable sentences on the counterfactual supposition that the language is
augmented by stronger axioms of infinity; and Maddy (1988,b), for critical discussion. Chihara
(2004) argues, as well, that conceptual possibilities can be treated as imaginary situations with
regard to the construction of open-sentence tokens, where the latter can then be availed of in
order to define nominalistically adequate arithmetic properties.
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